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ABSTRACT 
The study investigates whether raising technology transfer and strengthening the intellectual 
property rights (IPR) regime trigger domestic innovation by employing a panel data analysis 
for 58 developed and developing countries in the 1960-2010 period. Since theoretical and 
empirical literature has proved that innovation and technology were the prominent drivers of 
development process, analyzing the determinants of these factors have become crucial. Due to 
the globalization process, knowledge spreads faster than any other social and economic 
indicators; which makes the interactions between the types of knowledge more important. 
Thus, the study analyzes the impacts of foreign patents (as a proxy for technology transfer) 
and IPR on domestic innovation. According to the empirical analysis, it is found that 
technology transfer triggers domestic innovation both in developed and developing world. 
Contrary, it is also found that intellectual property protection is a detrimental factor for 
domestic innovation in mid income group while it bears fruit in high income group. 
Keywords: Innovation, technology transfer, intellectual property rights, patents.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Today’s economy considerably makes progress by using knowledge and technology. 
This fact refers to the importance of knowledge and the necessity of investigating the sub-
factors that affect the production of knowledge and technology. Within this scope, the study 
focuses on two important determinants of the production of knowledge and technology; and 
examines the effects of IPR and technology transfer on domestic innovation by operating with 
various samples. 
Since the mid 1980’s and 1990’s, many economic models have considered technology 
as an endogenous factor (i.e. Romer, 1990) and assumed that the accumulation of the 
technology strongly depends on the stock of the knowledge. According to this fact we may 
suggest that any knowledge available now to be used is an important source for future 
innovation. Thus, for a national economy or – in a micro framework – for an innovator firm, 
either domestic or transferred knowledge from abroad are considered as the potential 
knowledge stock to develop new ideas. Because of domestic knowledge stock is already 
scarce and does not lead to a technological accumulation in developing countries, the 
potential impact of the transferred knowledge has become even more important in those 
countries. In this framework, the first hypothesis of this study is that technology transfer has a 
positive impact on domestic innovation. 
In our age, it is not that easy to reach and use an existing idea. Intellectual property 
rights (IPR), which give a right of retention to the inventor of the idea, make it difficult to 
build the new ideas on the existing knowledge stock. However, there is a controversy on the 
impact of IPR. Some arguments and even empirical evidences suggest that IPR encourages 
the creation of new ideas while some others assert that it hinders bunching the ideas together. 
Especially the leading international institutions force countries to implement stronger IPR 
policies. So, – in the light of the suggestions of the mainstream global policy on IPR our 
second hypothesis is that IPR protection has a positive impact on domestic innovation. 
Although the practices of IPR are based on the 15th century, its main economic impacts 
have emerged during and post industrial revolution periods. Since then, the mainstream 
perspective on IPR claims that the protection of knowledge constitutes an incentive 
mechanism for potential inventors. The same view also asserts that without such a protection 
system no one will go into the effort of any innovation process (WIPO, 2011: 5). However, 
one should consider that IPR system gives monopoly rights to the parties which may obstruct 
the knowledge spillover mechanism, despite its encouragement function. Moreover, the 
negative impact might overweigh the positive one in different economic and structural 
environment. This rationale constitutes an important key point for testing our second 
hypothesis.  
Due to the heterogeneity within the global economy, each country might be influenced 
differently by transferred technology and IPR protection in the practice. Since many 
developing countries which do not have any sufficient infrastructure for innovation and could 
innovate only products with low value-added while developed countries utilize effectively 
functioning innovation mechanisms. Due to above mentioned facts, developing countries need 
time to establish the essential infrastructure for managing an innovation process which 
depends mostly on executing a learning-by-doing process by transferring technology from 
foreign countries. 
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Within this scope, the study exhibits empirical evidences by employing panel data 
analysis which covers twenty high-income, nineteen mid-income and nineteen low-income 
countries. Now, before making the quantitative analysis let us give a brief literature survey. 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The previous theoretical and empirical studies indicate that the existing knowledge 
stock is an important determinant of innovation. However, technology transfer is an important 
source of domestic innovation according the current literature and the political views of 
international institutions. Indeed, the more technology and knowledge flow from abroad the 
more domestic innovation rise. 
Taylor (1993) and Taylor (1994) have stressed that in a North-South based global 
framework, southern region which imports technology from abroad should provide the 
necessary conditions for northern innovators such as IPR protection. Otherwise, the global 
innovation rate will reduce, the transfer of technology will decline and correspondingly the 
further innovation possibilities for the South will fall. 
In a dynamic general equilibrium analysis, Lai (1998) has reported that if technology 
transfer comes to the South via FDI, stronger IPR protection in the South may raise domestic 
innovation in this region. However, if technology transfer comes through imitation, the 
opposite effects will emerge. According to the inferences of Lai (1998) it might be suggested 
that countries transferring technology through FDI may attract the potential FDI inflows from 
the North by strengthening their IPR system. Similarly, Naghavi (2007) has stated that 
developing countries should strategically implement stronger intellectual property right 
regimes to induce multinational companies (MNCs) of developed countries. In such a policy 
regime, MNCs will tend to less R&D intensive industries of developing countries through 
FDI and enhance domestic innovation. 
The indicators for domestic innovation, technology transfer and IPR protection are 
proxied by different variables. Although most of the early empirical studies in the economic 
growth and innovation literature have used R&D investments and expenditures as a proxy of 
domestic innovation (i.e. Park, 1999; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003; Park, 2005 etc.), many 
others have used residential patent applications and patent application to US Patent Office 
(i.e. Lerner, 2002; Chen and Puttinanum, 2005; Schneider, 2005; Branstetter et al., 2006; 
Allred and Park 2007 etc.). To proxy technology transfer, either trade indicators (i.e. Maskus 
and Penubarti, 1995; Fink and Braga, 1999; Co, 2004 etc.), foreign direct investment inflows 
(i.e. Lee and Mansfield, 1996; Mayer and Pfister, 2001 etc.), or non-residential patent 
applications (i.e. Lerner, 2002; Branstetter et al., 2006; Allred and Park, 2007 etc.) are 
employed. However, as might be expected, the hardest difficulty has been on measuring the 
strength of IPR protection which changed by the type of the implemented policies. The early 
empirical studies generally overcome this problem by using Rapp-Rozek Index (Rapp and 
Rozek, 1990). As an example, Gould and Gruben (1996) found that stronger IPR protection 
leads to higher economic growth rates based on a dataset of 79 countries for the 1960-1988 
period by using the RRI. Openness has also a positive impact on innovation in close 
economies. By using the same index, the RRI, Thompson and Rushing (1996) and Thompson 
and Rushing (1999) stressed that the growth effect of IPR protections exists only in countries 
which already achieved a certain level of development. In other words, IPR protections might 
have some positive effects on economic growth; but the possible benefit depends on the level 
of technological infrastructure and the capacity of physical and human capital. 
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However, the Ginarte-Park Index (Ginarte and Park, 1997; and as the updated version 
Park, 2008) has come into prominence due to its measurement method, being updated in 
every five years by maintaining the relative position of countries. The Ginarte-Park Index 
varies between zero and five; consisting of five sub-categories. The subcategories are as 
follows; the coverage of intellectual property, the membership status in international treaties, 
the duration of protection, the enforcement mechanisms and the restrictions on patent rights 
(Park, 2008). Walter Park, the co-author of the first publication on the index and the current 
updater, has updated the index in his 2008 paper and still has been updating the index in every 
five years.
1
 To remunerate the two founders of the index, it will be called as the Ginarte-Park 
Index in the study. The subcategories and components of the index are shown in appendix. 
While investigating the impacts of technology transfer or patent protection on 
economies, estimating their impacts on the total production may not be the best identification. 
The whole production of an economy (i.e. GDP) consists of many different factors and 
determinants. Instead of GDP, examining the impacts of technology transfer and patent 
protection on technological production (i.e. innovation and patenting activities) might give 
more considerable results. To clarify this proposition, Park (1999) reveals that IPR protection 
do not directly affect economic growth while it affects physical investments and R&D 
investments by using the GPI index. Similarly, Kanwar and Evenson (2003) and Kanwar and 
Evenson (2009) found that IPR protection significantly affects technological change and 
R&D investment in their panel data analysis for the 1981-1990 period. 
For countries that are still in the technologically developing stage, technology transfer 
may most likely affect their learning-by-doing process, technological improvement and 
thereby their development process. So that, it might be claimed that either developed or 
developing countries might benefit from transferred technology. The empirical consistency of 
the claim is going to be tested in the next section. Also, the benefits derived from stronger 
IPR policies might depend on the development level of countries. Chen and Puttinanum 
(2005) suggest that domestic innovation in developing countries is raised by the increased 
IPR protection in a panel data analysis including sixty-four developing countries for the 
period 1975-2000. As in the inferences of Thompson and Rushing (1996) and Thompson and 
Rushing (1999), the effects of IPR depend on the development level of the countries as their 
technological abilities differ. The role of development level was also emphasized by 
Schneider (2005) who analyzed nineteen developed and twenty-eight developing countries for 
the period 1970-1990. The results of the study show that even though the innovation effects of 
IPR protections are more significant in developed countries, in most of the developing 
country regressions of the study, the sign of IPR protection is negative. It is also found that 
the positive effects of high-technology imports for domestic innovation are similar for both 
country groups. Similarly, Falvey et al. (2006) found that IPR protection has a positive 
significant effect on economic growth for low and high income countries; not for the mid-
income countries based on a dataset consisting of seventy-nine countries. However, Hudson 
and Minea (2013) suggest that the effect of IPR protection on innovation is more complex 
than it is described in the previous literature based on an analysis for sixty-two developing 
and developed countries for the period 1980-2009. They have stated that the relationship 
under question involves some non-linearity which depends on the level of IPR protection and 
initial GDP per capita.  
Some researchers dwelled upon opennes and set up relations with IPR protections. 
Gancia and Bonfiglioli (2008) emphasize the role of openness as in Gould and Gruben 
                                                          
1
 The last update has been given with a coverage of 1960-2010 period. 
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(1996). In a panel data analysis of fifty-three countries for the period 1965-1990, they 
concluded that IPR protections are most beneficial in open countries. In addition, integration 
with countries that have weak IPR protection, may reduce the global economic growth rate. 
3. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The aim of the empirical analysis is to test the two hypotheses which have been given in 
the introduction. Hence, the varying effects of technology transfer and IPR protection on 
domestic innovation are analyzed. The effects of the non-residential patent applications (as a 
proxy for technology transfer) and IPR Index on residential patent applications (as a proxy for 
domestic innovation) is going to be analyzed by employing panel data estimation technique. 
The patent production function is defined as below; 
                       (1) 
where IPR,   ,   ,   and     represent intellectual property rights, domestic patents, foreign 
patents, human capital index and any other control variables respectively. The number of 
foreign patents (patent applications by non-residents) stands as a proxy for technology 
transfer from abroad. It assumed that the induced technology in the past may affect the 
innovation of the present. This is why the lagged value of the foreign patents is used. Also the 
research and development (R&D) expenditures could be used in the analysis as a potential 
determinant of domestic innovation. But due to the data limitations for the R&D data, this 
variable is excluded. Thus, the reduced form for the estimation is as follows; 
                                         ∑           
(2) 
The (    ) term in the equation stands for the control variables. Due to the strong 
correlation between domestic patents and foreign patents in the equation (2) the endogeneity 
problem may arise. To prevent the possible endogeneity problem in the estimations, the 
instrumental variable estimator (IV, two stage panel data analysis) method has been 
employed
2
. Correspondingly, the foreign patents variable –which stands for the technology 
transfer from abroad – has been instrumented in the equation (2). The Wooldridge test 
statistic is used to investigate the presence of the first order autocorrelation. The model is 
estimated by two-step Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation with GMM option. Various 
lagged values of the instrumental variable are used as instrumental variables for the two-step 
IV GMM estimations. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
2
 The equations were estimated via the (xtivreg28) module of Schaffer (2012) which is an updated version of the 
STATA software’s instrumental variable for panel data module (xtivreg). 
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Table 1: The Variables and Data Sources 
Variable Data Source 
IPR 
Obtained from the current updater of the Ginarte&Park Index, Prof. W. 
Park. The detailed information on this data will be given in appendix. 
Human Capital Index 
PWT 8.0 - Index of human capital per person, based on years of 
schooling 
Openness 
WDI – Calculated as the share of the sum of export and import in the 
GDP. 
Domestic Patents WDI – Number of Residential Patent Applications 
Foreign Patents WDI – Number of Non-Residential Patent Applications 
 Note: All the data is obtained from World Bank’s World Development Indicator (WDI) database, Penn 
World Tables 8.0 (PWT) and Prof. Walter Park for the GPI Index. 
Table 1 shows the descriptions and sources of the data.  The analysis covers the 1960-
2010 period and fifty-eight countries (20 high-income, 19 mid-income, 19 low-income). Since 
the IPR index data is produced for every five years, all data is averaged into five-year spans. 
Thus the time dimension of the data is eleven in consequence of this arrangement. Due to data 
limitations for patent and IPR data it is not possible to involve all developed and developing 
countries. 
 
Table 2: Sample Statistics 
 ALL COUNTRIES  HIGH  MIDDLE  LOW 
Variable Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev.  Mean Std. Dev. 
ln(IPR) .740 .6011  1.181 .3195  .5826 .587  .447 .579 
ln(h) .776 .279  .9928 .1738  .7516 .230  .577 .255 
ln(open) -.684 .715  -.7822 .6977  -.643 .8605  -.611 .540 
ln(Pd) 5.83 2.821  8.11 1.953  5.23 2.483  3.695 1.93 
ln(Pf) 6.99 2.08  8.26 1.867  6.86 1.884  5.613 1.53 
 
Table 2 displays sample statistics of the variables used in the analysis. The estimations 
of the equation (5) are shown on Table 3. Table 3 includes three post-estimation diagnostic 
test results: the Anderson LR statistic tests whether the chosen instruments are under-
identified; the Cragg-Donald F statistic tests whether the chosen instruments are weakly 
identified; and the Hansen J statistic tests whether the instruments are over-identified or not. 
All these diagnostic test statistics are significant which mean the chosen instruments are 
valid.
3
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
3
 For more information, you may also see Baum, et. al., (2007). 
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Table 3: The Effects of Technology Transfer and IPR on Residential Patent 
Applications: 2-Step IV (GMM) Estimations 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * symbols imply statistically significance at the level of 1%, 5% and %10 respectively. 
Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parantheses. The null hypothesis of 
Anderson canonical LR Statistic states that the equation is underidentified. ^ symbol shows that the Cragg-
Donald statistic on testing the weak identification problem is in the acceptable range. 
Results in Table 3 show the effects of technology transfer and IPR protection on 
domestic innovation. The estimation results suggest that the increases in technology transfer 
(foreign patent applications) significantly raise domestic innovation (domestic patent 
applications) for all country samples. According to the results, as the number of foreign patent 
application in the previous period increases by 1%, the number of domestic patent 
applications today increases by 0.39% in the whole sample, 0.11% in the high-income 
countries, 0.86% in the mid-income countries and 0.46% in the low-income countries. The 
coefficients are found significant for all samples. At first sight, we may suggest that 
technology transfer has a considerably important role on domestic innovation. However, the 
intensity of the impact varies among countries. Its impact is four times more in the low-
income countries and about eight times more in the mid-income countries in proportion to the 
impact in the high-income group. This evidence is valid for the first hypothesis of the study. 
The high-income countries are less inclined to exploit the incoming technology from abroad 
since they are closer to the technological frontier. 
Regarding the protection of IPR, the evidences show more diversifying impacts among 
country groups. Stronger IPR protection has positive impact on domestic innovation in the 
Dependent 
Variable:    
ALL 
COUNTRIES 
HIGH  
INCOME 
MIDDLE  
INCOME 
LOW 
INCOME 
     
         0.394 *** 
(0.166) 
0.114 * 
(0.064) 
0.859 *** 
(0.177) 
0.463 ** 
(0.198) 
IPR -0.325 * 
(0.193)  
0.944 ** 
(0.373) 
-1.48 ***  
(0.394) 
- 0.057 
(0.294) 
Openness 0.255 
 (0.203) 
0.521  
(0.387) 
0.141 
(0.335) 
0.071 
(0.316) 
Human Capital  2.28 *** 
(0.648) 
1.44 ** 
(0.617) 
4.66 ** 
 (2.15) 
- 0.929 
(2.81) 
     
Time Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
     
Cragg-Donald 
F statistic 
398.16 ^ 40.52 ^ 52.49 ^ 34.22 ^ 
Anderson LR 
Statistic 
425.45 *** 93.05 *** 105.73 *** 77.94*** 
Hansen J (P-
value) 
0.08 0.12 0.57 0.14 
Number of 
Observations 
409 153 125 114 
  Number of 
Countries 
58 20 19 19 
F Statistic 10.67 *** 5.00 *** 7.96 *** 5.74 *** 
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high income countries, while the impact is negative in the overall sample and in the middle 
income countries. There exists no statistically significant impact for the low income countries. 
The results reveal that the number of domestic patents decreases by 0.33% in the whole 
sample, increases by 0.94 % in the high income countries but it decreases by around 1.48 % in 
the middle income countries as the strength of IPR tightens by 1 %. Since the results confirm 
the second hypothesis for the high-income group but rejects for the mid-income and the whole 
sample, it is intrigue. These results also justify the studies in the existing literature which have 
discoursed on the importance of the achieved development level. Indeed, domestic innovation 
in the developed countries –the high-income group– benefit from stronger IPR policies while 
developing countries – the mid-income group– are harmed by them. 
Openness as one of the control variable is not found significant in any estimated sample. 
However the other control variable, the human capital index is estimated statistically 
significant for each sample; except the low-income group. The results show that as the human 
capital index increases by 1% the number of domestic patents increases by 2.29% in the 
whole sample, 1.44% in the high-income countries and 4.66% in the mid-income countries. 
The evidences can be interpreted as more human capital improves innovation performance of 
countries. 
4. CONCLUSION 
Since innovation –or new ideas– has been considered as an essential condition for 
economic growth and development process of today’s economies, the sources and drivers of 
innovation have become more important compared to the past. For most of the developed and 
upper-middle income countries, we are no more able to explain their economic growth 
progress only with the fixed capital investment. Many theoretical and empirical studies in the 
economic growth theory have propounded this fact since the mid-1980s; and implied the 
importance of research and development expenditures. However, the research and 
development expenditure may be considered only as the first attempt for innovation and do 
not guarantee the eventuated new ideas which are the finalized innovation that may advance 
the economy. So that, this study has focused on domestic innovation and investigated how 
technology transfer from abroad and intellectual property rights affect the innovation 
performance of countries. 
The study has regarded the transferred technology as a part of the knowledge stock. 
Thus, with reference to the theoretical literature, it is assumed that the existing knowledge 
stock determines future innovation and the lagged value of the technology transfer has been 
used. The results of the study reveal that transferring technology from abroad have positive 
impacts on domestic innovation both in developed and developing world. Furthermore, the 
results also show that the intensity of this effect varies among countries. The impact of the 
transferred technology on domestic innovation is much higher in low-income and middle-
income countries as against the high-income countries. This is a very veridical result indeed. 
Because most of the developed countries are closer to the technological frontier and this 
makes it difficult for them to exploit the incoming technology from abroad. 
The other focal point of the study is on the impacts of intellectual property rights 
protection. The analysis shows more diversifying results with regard to IPR. It is found that 
domestic innovation in the high-income countries is positively affected by stronger IPR 
policies while the middle-income countries are adversely affected. This is an impressive 
result. Contrary to the international mainstream view on IPR, these protections have not 
monotype impacts upon countries. Innovation and technological production sectors in 
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countries that are still in a technologically developing stage are damaged from IPR protection. 
Besides, for the whole sample which includes all the high, middle and low income countries, 
the impact of IPR is also estimated negatively. However it is not observed any statistically 
significant results for the low-income countries. 
In consideration of the results obtained in the analysis, we may suggest that transferring 
technology from abroad is beneficial for any country group even the intensity of this positive 
impact varies among countries. Implementing stronger IPR policies do not yield positive 
effects in middle-income countries; but for the high-income countries, the exact opposite 
effects are observed. The latter effect might be associated with the importance of the 
development stage. We may assert that countries that are still in the technologically 
developing stage and that do not have a self-activating innovation mechanism should 
implement lower protection levels; at least until achieving the next stage. 
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APPENDIX: 
Table A1. Country List 
High Middle Low 
Australia 
Austria 
Belgium 
Canada 
Denmark 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Japan 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Portugal 
Spain 
Sweden 
Switzerland 
United Kingdom 
United States 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Iran, Islamic Rep. 
Ireland 
Jamaica 
Jordan 
Korea, Rep. 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
Panama 
Peru 
Singapore 
South Africa 
Thailand 
Tunisia 
Turkey 
Venezuela, RB 
Bangladesh 
Bolivia 
Egypt, Arab Rep. 
El Salvador 
Guatemala 
Honduras 
India 
Indonesia 
Kenya 
Morocco 
Pakistan 
Paraguay 
Philippines 
Sri Lanka 
Syrian Arab Republic 
Ukraine 
Vietnam 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
 
Table A2: The Subcategories and Components of Ginarte-Park Index 
1. Coverage Available Not Available 
Patentability of pharmaceuticals 1/8 0 
Patentability of chemicals 1/8 0 
Patentability of food 1/8 0 
Patentability of surgical products 1/8 0 
Patentability of microorganisms 1/8 0 
Patentability of utility models 1/8 0 
Patentability of software 1/8 0 
Patentability of plant and animal varieties 1/8 0 
 
2. Membership in international treaties Signatory Not Signatory 
Paris convention and revisions 1/5 0 
Patent cooperation treaty 1/5 0 
Protection of new varieties (UPOV) 1/5 0 
Budapest treaty (microorganism deposits) 1/5 0 
Trade-related intellectual property rights (TRIPS) 1/5 0 
 
3. Duration of protection  Full Partial 
 1 0 < f < 1  * 
* where f is the duration of protection as a fraction of 20 years from the date of application or 17 
years from the date of grant (for grant-based patent systems). 
 
4. Enforcement mechanisms Available Not available 
Preliminary (pre-trial) injunctions 1/3 0 
Contributory infringement 1/3 0 
Burden of proof reversal 1/3 0 
 
5. Restrictions on patent rights Yes No 
Working requirements 1/3 0 
Compulsory licensing 1/3 0 
Revocation of patents 1/3 0 
Source: Park (2008) 
 
 
